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The Doctrines of Sin and Atonement
in Reinhold Niebuhr’s Theology: An
Analysis and a Proposed Corrective
Clayton E. Beish
Sessional Lecturer, Dept, of Religious Studies
University of Saskatchewan
I. Overview
It has sometimes been stated that Reinhold Niebuhr has
presented the most penetrating analysis since Augustine of the
persistent and pervasive reality of sin in human existence. In
presenting his analysis of the fallen human condition Niebuhr
posits two fundamental forms of sin which he terms “the sin of
pride” and “the sin of sensuality” . The former entails a denial
of human finiteness and exaggerated claims for the self, while
the latter entails a denial of human freedom and a subsequent
loss of the self. Niebuhr argues that the sin of sensuality is a
derivative form of the sin of pride; thus in his analysis all man-
ifestations of sin tend to become subsumed under the primary
category of pride. His portrayal of the atoning work of Christ
consequently focuses exclusively on the “shattering” of pride
in each person’s life so as to deliver them from pride’s illusions
and bring them to a recognition of their finite limitations.
This article will challenge Niebuhr’s claim that the sin of
sensuality is secondary to the sin of pride. It will be argued in-
stead that pride and sensuality should be treated as co-lateral
and complementary forms of sin which must both be addressed
in any adequate formulation of an atonement theory. The di-
rect implication is that Christ’s atoning work must be such that
it not only shatters pride and restores a recognition of finite-
ness, but also salvages forfeited selfhood and affirms human
freedom.
Furthermore, it will be argued that this positive comple-
ment to Niebuhr’s presentation of the atoning work of Christ
does not necessitate a move away from a theology of the cross
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to a theology of glory. Instead, both the shattering of pride and
the reconstruction of selfhood can be comprehended under a
theology of the cross.
II. The Sin of Pride and the Sin of Sensuality
A. Basic Terminology
First we will need to situate Niebuhr’s ideas and provide
some basic definitions: Niebuhr’s most systematic treatment
of the human condition, the pervasiveness of sin, and the rem-
edy for sin demonstrated in the atoning work of Christ, is to
be found in his Gifford Lectures of 1939, later published un-
der the title The Nature and Destiny of Man. In this work,
Niebuhr describes the natural and spiritual dimensions of hu-
man existence under the rubrics of “finiteness” and “freedom”
.
These two dimensions constitute an inner paradox as all per-
sons discover themselves to be “both free and bound, both
limited and limitless”. ^ The tension arising from this appar-
ent contradiction is manifested in anxiety which (in a positive
sense) is “the basis of all human creativity” and (in a negative
sense) is “the internal precondition of sin”.^ In seeking to re-
solve this contradictory state of affairs human beings inevitably
(but not necessarily) 3 succumb to the temptation either to hide
their finiteness by attempting to overreach the limits of human
creatureliness, or to hide their freedom by losing themselves
in some aspect of the world’s vitalities. ^ The former, Niebuhr
terms “the sin of pride”
;
the latter, he calls “the sin of sensu-
ality”. Niebuhr succinctly summarizes this view, stating:
When anxiety has conceived it brings forth both pride and sensual-
ity. Humanity falls into pride, when it seeks to raise its contingent
existence to unconditional significance; it falls into sensuality, when
it seeks to escape from its unlimited possibilities of freedom, from
the perils and responsibilities of self-determination, by immersing
itself into a ‘mutable good’, by losing itself in some natural vitality.^
In the sin of pride, persons claim ultimacy for themselves,
becoming their own god, and claiming to be the source of their
j
own fulfilment. In the sin of sensuality, persons yield ulti-
|
macy to another being or object, letting it become their god,
|





B. The Sources of Niehuhr^s Conceptual Model
In preparing for his Gifford Lectures, Niebuhr read a just
published work by Emil Brunner (Der Mensch im Wider-
spruch^ 1937) which later appeared in English as Man in Re-
volt. Niebuhr discovered that the same issues he was wrestling
with in defining a clearly Christian anthropology were being
dealt with by Brunner in a manner with which he wholeheart-
edly concurred.^ It is useful to note that the specific Christian
understanding of human nature which Niebuhr develops in vol-
ume one of Nature and Destiny greatly resembles the analysis
found in Brunner’s Man in Revolt.
Brunner drew heavily on Kierkegaard’s thought in his anal-
ysis of sin, and it is quite likely that Niebuhr was drawn to
a closer examination of Kierkegaard’s writings through Brun-
ner’s bookJ Niebuhr’s basic understanding of human nature
being characterized by both finiteness and freedom, the para-
doxical nature of which produces a fundamental state of anx-
iety which is the internal precondition of sin,^ comes straight
from Kierkegaard’s writings.^ Furthermore, Kierkegaard in his
writings defined two distinctive forms of despair which arise
in the failure to actualize one’s selfhood: the one arises from
the vain attempt of willing to be a self on one’s own, what
Kierkegaard called “defiance”—approximating what Niebuhr
terms the sin of pride; the other, from the passive acquies-
cence not to be a self at all—approximating what Niebuhr calls
“sensuality”—and which Kierkegaard termed “weakness”.
In further developing the concepts of “pride” and “sensual-
ity” as signifying the basic forms of human sinfulness, Niebuhr
also shows the influence of certain psychoanalytic theories of
his time in which the “will-to-power” and the libidinal impulse
are regarded as the basic human impulses, both of which are
said to be derived from a more basic sense of anxiety. As an
apologist for the Christian faith in the modern world, Niebuhr
deliberately incorporated the findings of contemporary social
scientific analysis in elaborating his theological views. It was,
for him, an important component of his theological reflection
to speak the language and utilize the concepts of the modern
age.
Finally, Niebuhr calls attention to the rich theological tra-
dition in which the fundamental form of sin is variously defined
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either in terms of hubris (the Greek word for arrogance or self-
elevation)—which corresponds to Niebuhr’s use of the term
“pride” 12—or concupiscence (the Latin word for eager desire,
usually associated with the passions and the love of pleasure)
—
which has an affinity with Niebuhr’s concept of “sensuality”. 1^
Both hubris and concupiscence have been identified as primal
forms of sin in historical theological thought. Pride is fre-
quently cited in the theological tradition as the original form
of sin on the basis of both Lucifer’s and Adam’s desire to be
like God; 14 but concupiscence is frequently given primal sta-
tus as well, in denoting fallen humanity’s basic state of being
enslaved to the passions. 1^ In addition, Niebuhr’s definition of
sensuality as an “unlimited devotion to limited values”!^ par-
allels the definitions given by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
of sin as a turning from the immutable good (i.e., God) to the
mutable good (or mutable goods); for Aquinas this phrase is
used in specific reference to concupiscence. This dichotomy
between pride and sensuality itself hearkens back to the classi-
cal theological distinction between sins of the intellect and sins
of the will or passions.
C. The Relationship of Sensuality and Pride
Thus far in the discussion, the sin of pride and the sin of
sensuality appear to be contrasting but co-equal components
of our fallen human condition. However, Niebuhr’s primary
concern is with addressing the sin of pride. On many occasions
he speaks as if the entire problem of human sinfulness could be
discussed in terms of pride alone. For example, in one extended
passage he states:
The real evil in the human situation. . .lies in humanity’s unwill-
ingness to recognize and acknowledge the weakness, finiteness and
dependence of its position, in its inclination to grasp after a power
and security which transcend the possibilities of human existence,
and in its effort to pretend a virtue and knowledge which are beyond
the limits of mere creatures. . .[T]he sin of humanity consists in the
vanity and pride by which it imagines itself, its nations, its cultures,
its civilizations to be divine. Sin is thus the unwillingness of hu-
manity to acknowledge its creatureliness and dependence upon God
and its effort to make one’s own life independent and secure. It is
the “vain imagination” by which humanity hides the conditioned,
contingent and dependent character of its existence and seeks to
give it the appearance of unconditioned reality.
^
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Consequently, when Niebuhr moves from his detailed analy-
sis of pride to a close examination of sensuality, one finds much
of the discussion focused on proving that the sin of sensuality
is secondary to and derivative of the sin of pride. However, the
evidence which Niebuhr presents to prove his point is rather
ambiguous, and his argument is, in my judgment, quite incon-
clusive.
This conclusion on Niebuhr’s part that the sin of sensuality
is a secondary effect of the sin of pride has major consequences,
not only for his analysis of the nature of sin, but also for his
understanding of the remedy for sin articulated in his view of
the atonement. For if sensuality can be subsumed under pride
as merely one of its consequences,20 then if one can prescribe an
effective corrective to the sin of pride, it is to be expected that
the sin of sensuality will be counteracted at the same time
—
and by the same means. However (and this is the important
point) if the sin of sensuality is co-lateral to the sin of pride,
and is not to be subsumed under it as a derivative effect, but
is to be treated as a second primary form of sin, then the
specific corrective for counteracting the sin of pride may not be
effective in counteracting the sin of sensuality, and a separate
strategy must be defined for dealing with and overcoming this
form of sin.
D, Implications for the Doctrine of the Atonement
Since Niebuhr sees pride as the persistent and pervasive
form under which sin is manifested, it is natural for him to de-
fine the corrective to this sin in terms of the antithesis of pride.
Pride evidences itself as the elevation of the self over others
(and over God); consequently, the proper remedy to pride is
defined by Niebuhr as a “sacrificial love” which places the inter-
ests of others before the interests of one’s self. 21 Niebuhr argues
that this sacrificial love is synonymous with agape
^
the perfect
love shown in Christ.22 In other writings Niebuhr describes this
sacrificial agape as a “heedlessness toward the interests of the
self”.23 This love is manifested most powerfully by Christ on
the cross. There, Niebuhr argues, Christ displayed a “perfect
disinterestedness” with regard to himself24 which culminated
in a final act of “self-abnegation” with his death2^ as he offered
his life up for the sake of others.
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The problem is this: Such sacrificial love which renounces
primary regard for the self may indeed be the appropriate rem-
edy to the sin of pride. But it is not at all appropriate for recti-
fying the sin of sensuality since that sin itself promotes a “self-
abnegation” and a forfeiture of one’s self for the sake of others.
As Susan Nelson Dunfee quite rightly observes, what Niebuhr
posits as humanity’s highest virtue, self-sacrificing love, can
easily become confused with the escape from one’s self which
the sin of sensuality encourages. She charges that “by making
self-sacrificial love the ultimate Christian virtue, one makes the
sin of [sensuality] into a virtue as well, and thereby encourages
those already committing the sin of [sensuality] to stay in that
state.” 26 In other words, rather than breaking the power which
this form of sin exerts over such individuals’ lives, the call for
self-sacrifice merely serves to reinforce this form of sin. 27
III. Feminist and Liberation Critiques
A. Woman’s Sin”
In recent years feminist writers have taken Niebuhr to task
on this very point. Valerie Saiving, in a landmark article first
published in 1960, presented a penetrating critique of the dom-
inant characterization of the human situation provided in con-
temporary theology with “its identification of sin with pride,
will-to-power, exploitation, self-assertiveness, and the treat-
ment of others as objects rather than persons.” These traits,
she argued, are characteristic of male social and biological pat-
terning in wich there is an orientation to personal achievement,
self-differentiation and self-development.
The social and biological patterning of women, Saiving
claimed, promotes passiveness rather than assertiveness, and a
surrender of self-identity rather than an actualization of it. In
particular, Saiving stated that
. . .the temptations of woman as woman are not the same as the
temptations of man as man, and the specifically feminine forms of
sin— “feminine” . . .because they are outgrowths of the basic fem-
inine character structure—have a quality which can never be en-
compassed by such terms as ‘pride’ and ‘will-to-power.’ They are
better suggested by such terms as. . .underdevelopment or negation
of the self.2S
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Judith Plaskow, in her extensive critique of Niebuhr’s doc-
trine of sin, adds her voice to that of Saiving and states:
The flaw in [Niebuhr’s] doctrine of sin lies in the fact that, in subor-
dinating sensuality, he loses sight of it as a signiflcant human sin and
one independent of pridefulness. He focuses only on those aspects
of sensuality which do seem to follow from pride, entirely rejecting
important dimensions of the human flight from freedom. He is thus
unable to speak to or evaluate those patterns of human behaviour
which are particularly characteristic of women..
B. Sins of the Weak and the Oppressed
I wish to argue that the failure of Niebuhr’s doctrine of sin
to address the full spectrum of the human condition extends
far beyond the particular experiences of women. As Dennis
McCann notes, “A psychological profile on Niebuhr’s anthro-
pology would probably suggest that he was concerned with the
aggressive personality and its problems.” William John Wolf
adds that “Niebuhr’s categories fail adequately to account for
the sins of the weak person as they do so forcefully for those
of the strong person.” Yet weakness must be understood in
a broader context than just the failure to be self-assertive or
“manly” (in the sense of a character fault) as Wolf uses the
term. Here, I believe, it is helpful to keep in mind Kierkegaard’s
use of the term “weakness” as a technical term to denote the
opposite of “defiance”.
To give a brief illustration, I vividly recall the words of
an elderly American black man remembering his experiences
of some fifty years ago. Back then, he said, a black person
learned never to look a white person in the eye when speaking
or being spoken to; one looked down to the ground instead.
To look a white person in the eye was interpreted as showing
defiance. Blacks learned, in concern for their own safety, not
to appear defiant.
In such cases, self-interest often required the appearance of
weakness for the sake of preserving selfhood. Such a display of
“weakness” cannot be interpreted as a sign of personal char-
acter deficiency; it was imposed on black people and generally
accepted by them for many years in acquiescence to the bitter
reality of one’s assigned role within society. Yet tragically., even
such a false (and often deliberately projected) appearance of
weakness inevitably had a negative effect on a person’s self-
image and actually vitiated one’s selfhood. Underlying this
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artificially constructed appearance of weakness lay a genuine
powerlessness; unless one became defiant, at some personal
risk, one remained powerless to change the demeaning and de-
bilitating social reality to which one was subjected.
To offer yet another illustration, in the Canadian context
we bear the shameful legacy of generations of aboriginal youth
from northern areas being transported to southern residential
schools where the use of English was enforced, their native
language was forbidden, and adherence to white customs and
practices was made mandatory. Defiance of these rules was
harshly suppressed through physical punishment, and even
compliance did not remove the repeated psychological abuse
experienced by those youth in having their traditional values,
beliefs and customs denigrated. As a result, the self-identity
of many native people became vitiated, dissipated, and disin-
tegrated. Again, this was not of their own choosing, but was
pressed upon them by the dominant culture through coercive
and oppressive means.
Such examples are indicative of the situation of many of
the oppressed people of the world today. They have been
made “weak” not out of their own preference or desire; as
a consequence, their own sense of freedom, identity and self-
determination has been forfeited. Niebuhr has little to say to
those who are “weak” rather than strong, those who are passive
rather than self- assertive, those who are compliant rather than
defiant—especially when they are compelled to assume such
roles by forces beyond their own choosing. It must certainly
be admitted that Niebuhr speaks forcefully to the powerful,
the proud and those who would see no limits to their own self-
aggrandizement. But as John Raines comments, “Niebuhr’s
critique of the persistent pride and self-righteousness of col-
lective humanity does not seem very helpful in dealing with
the revolutionary struggle of peoples seeking to emerge from
centuries of oppression.” Roger Shinn offers a more detailed
criticism, stating that while Niebuhr “tears the camouflage
from the foolish pride and idolatries” of those tyrants who
would make themselves masters of the destiny of others, “he
says less about those who are buried in the struggle. . where
frustration is so oppressive that it is hard to awaken people
to action; where the development of. . .self-respect is painfully
difficult. . .where progress depends less upon shattering vain am-
bition than upon overcoming hopelessness.”
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IV. The Remedy of Sin
A, Sacrificial Love or Mutual Harmony?
The solution to this problematic situation emerges only as
we depart from Niebuhr’s thesis that the sin of pride is primary
and the sin of sensuality secondary so that all manifestations
of sin (and their corresponding remedies) can be characterized
in terms of pride alone. Instead, we must treat pride and sen-
suality as co-equal forms of sin, the one characterized by an
aggrandizement and assertion of the self in relation to others,
the other characterized by a diminishment and dissipation of
the self in relation to others. The necessary corrective to both
forms of sin, I propose, is the establishment of a proper bal-
ance which places the desires of the self neither above nor below
those of the other.
Niebuhr himself speaks of agape in this larger sense in Na-
ture and Destiny when he refers to it as “the ultimate and
final harmony of life with life”.^^ fjg gives primary status to
this “harmonious relation of life to life”, describing it as the
fundamental “law” of human nature^^ and “the ultimate norm
of human existence”. The specific content of this law of love
is explained by Niebuhr in a brief commentary on the Great
Commandment. This law, he says, contains three elements:
(a) The perfect relation of the soul to God in which obedience is
transcended by love, trust and confidence (“Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God”); (b) the perfect internal harmony of the soul with
itself in all of its desires and impulses: “With all thy heart and all
thy soul and all thy mind”; and (c) the perfect harmony of life with
life: “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”
Such a harmony of the self with God, the self with the self,
and the self with the neighbour is the antithesis both of pride
which seeks to subordinate others to the self and of sensuality
which seeks to subordinate the self to others. This harmony
does not allow the denial of finiteness which lies at the heart
of the sin of pride, for it prohibits the tendency, in Niebuhr’s
words, “to overestimate one’s power and significance and to
become everything. Neither does this harmony allow the
forfeiture of freedom which lies at the root of the sin of sensu-
ality; for it defines a relationship, again quoting Niebuhr, “in
which the self relates itself in its freedom to other selves in
their freedom under the will of God.”^^
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B. Shattering of Pride or Reconstruction of the Self?
What are the implications here for a theology of the cross?
In full consonance with the traditional emphasis upon the cross
as the means of our salvation, Niebuhr stresses that pride must
be shattered in order for the remedy for sin to be successfully
mediated to the individual. All persons must be brought to see
the vanity of their attempts to avoid finitude by pretending ul-
timacy for their own selves and their own will; they must be
brought to see the tragedy which results from their self-seeking
exertion of power over others. It is through Christ’s death on
the cross as the victim of the willful abuse of power by others
that the depths of this tragedy are most clearly seen. Only
through the realization that human sin—the sin of pride
—
causes God to suffer, is one brought to a position of despairing
of one’s own personal goodness.40
Despair, for Niebuhr, is the necessary precondition of sal-
vation; from despair arises contrition, and through contrition
one receives God’s mercy and forgiveness. 41 Niebuhr appeals
to St. Paul’s confession that “I am crucified with Christ” (Gal.
2:20) to reinforce his emphasis on the shattering of pride. Paul,
he says, uses the symbolism of participation in the death and
resurrection of Christ to assert that “the old, the sinful self,
the self which is centered in itself, must be ‘crucified.’ It must
be shattered and destroyedP^"^
Care must be taken, however, in applying such a forceful
image as the “shattering” or “destruction” of the self to the
process by which the sin of sensuality is to be remedied. In this
case one is no longer dealing with an inflated self-assertive will
which must be brought low, but with a self which has already
been weakened and dissipated through non-assertion, and may
even have been victimized and oppressed by others. It must
be remembered that God does not deal harshly with the weak;
“he will not break a bruised reed or quench a smoldering wick”
(Matt. 12:20). We should keep in mind that the fulfillment of
God’s plan for humanity as expressed in the Magnificat, e.g.,
entails not only the humbling of the mighty but also the raising
up of the weak.
It is this reconstruction of the forfeited self as an aspect of
salvation to which we must now turn. In finding release from
the sin of sensuality—the loss of selfhood—it is imperative that
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those who have succumbed to its effect should be brought to
see the vanity of their attempts to escape freedom by placing
themselves under the rule of another. Yet even here care must
be taken lest an inappropriate corrective be proposed. The at-
tempt to free oneself from subjection to others solely by one’s
own efforts—whether through a program of self-assertiveness,
rebellion against oppressive societal structures, or appropriat-
ing various psychological insights for “wholeness”— has the
undesirable effect of reintroducing the sin of pride through the
attempt to be a completed self on one’s own. Niebuhr, who was
quick to identify the various subtle forms under which pride
continually surfaces in human affairs, steadfastly warns that
it is impossible for self-realization to be accomplished through
the self consciously seeking its own ends.^3
However, merely to accept the rule of God over one’s self in
lieu of being made subject to the rule of a different “other” is
not an appropriate solution either, since it does not necessar-
ily restore one’s selfhood. Subjecting one’s self to the will of
another (even if that “other” is God) is, in Tillich’s language,
a “heteronomous” solution rather than a “theonomous” one.
The fruit of salvation is evidenced not in compelled subjuga-
tion to God but, as has already been stated, in a “relation
of the soul to God in which obedience is transcended by love,
trust and confidence.”
In identifying the proper solution, it must be clearly stated
that the necessary precondition to deliverance from both the
sin of pride and the sin of sensuality is a profound realization
of the consequences of one’s own choices, with the attendant
despairing of that chosen path. This point cannot be empha-
sized enough. What Niebuhr states for the sin of pride is no
less true for the sin of sensuality: “Without this despair there
is no possibility of the contrition which appropriates the divine
forgiveness.” 44
At one point Niebuhr speaks of a “creative despair” which
induces faith;45 it is this kind of despair which motivates indi-
viduals to reverse their chosen paths—i.e., to repent—and to
seek out a new path in which the intended harmony between
themselves, God and others can be established. Whether in
coming to despair in the ultimacy of their own selves, as with
the sin of pride, or in coming to despair in the ultimacy of
others, as with the sin of sensuality, they become aware that
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they must look to a power beyond themselves and beyond the
human or natural order to find the answer which they seek.
The primary factors in the loss of selfhood in the sin of sen-
suality are the flight from freedom and the forfeiture of self-
actualization. The recovery of freedom and self-actualization
is, therefore, an essential element in the reconstruction of the
self which accompanies the deliverance from this sin. In this
regard, an appropriate biblical text to illustrate the necessary
corrective to the sin of sensuality (paralleling Niebuhr’s appli-
cation of Galatians 2:20, “I am crucified with Christ”, to the
sin of pride) would be Galatians 5:1, “For freedom Christ has
set us free; stand fast, therefore, and do not submit again to
the yoke of slavery.”
Those who have fallen into the sin of sensuality have yielded
up their own freedom by letting themselves become subjected
to the will of others. In the remedy for this sin they must be
brought to see the tragedy of their own denial of selfhood, that
it contradicts God’s primary intention and design for humanity
and for their own life, and that ultimately it required God in
Christ going to the cross to win back their forfeited selfhood on
their behalf. Through despair, contrition, and the reception of
God’s grace through mercy and forgiveness, they are enabled to
lay hold of a liberating power beyond themselves and to regain
the selfhood which had been forfeited, take responsibility for
their lives, and assume the freedom to begin actualizing this
new selfhood in accordance with God’s original intent.
The cross is central to this realization. For it is in the
passion and death of Christ that one flnds the most powerful
witness to a fully actualized selfhood which resists the most
anxiety producing and coercive attempts to rob it of its iden-
tity, destroy it, or make it subject to another power. Jesus’
own testimony to his identity through his actions in his entry
into Jerusalem is that he is a divinely appointed king. Follow-
ing his arrest, neither the taunting, cruel and dehumanizing
abuse of the soldiers nor the coercive force of Pilate’s claim
to have the power of life and death over Jesus are sufficient
j
to make him deny this identity and surrender to either the
|
power of brute force or political authority. Even on the cross, I
in the depths of physical agony and emotional anguish, when
the inner harmony of his self-identity seems to have collapsed
j
and he cries out, “My God, why hast thou forsaken me?” this
j
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intense anxiety still does not culminate in a breach of relation-
ship with God, but in a final cry of affirmation and trust: “Into
thy hands I commit my spirit.” In short, Christ through his
passion and death—which graphically represent the most trau-
matic and anxiety-ridden conditions imaginable—successfully
resists the temptation to turn away from his trust in God and
place his selfhood under some other authority.
“I am crucified with Christ,” as St. Paul has said. Through
the event of the cross, Christ establishes the process of rec-
onciliation with God which is to be enacted in our own lives.
Scripture presents the image of Christ as the “Second Adam”
.
As the Second Adam, he recovers the essential harmony which
had been lost in the first Adam’s fall, and through his grace
—
which is a power both over us and in us which enables us to
become what we are truly meant to be^^—he makes it possible
for us to regain our own selfhood, to act in freedom, and to
live in harmony with God and neighbour.
While certainly we may agree with Niebuhr that the cross of
Christ shatters inflated pride, we have argued against him that
it does not necessitate the abnegation of the self—especially
a self which is already wounded and suffering. Instead, it has
been argued that the atonement accomplished by Christ on the
cross summons forth human freedom and responsibility rather
than negating it, and reinforces the constitution of the self
rather than diminishing it.
Notes
^ Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man
^
2 vols. (voL I: Hu-
man Nature^ New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1941; vol. II: Human
Destiny, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1943) [denoted hereafter
SiS NDlk II], 1:182
2 Ibid., 1:182, 183; cf. 185.
^ Niebuhr states that “Sin is natural for humanity in the sense that it
is universal but not in the sense that it is necessary. . .Sin is to be re-
garded as neither a necessity of human nature nor yet as a pure caprice
of human will. It proceeds rather from a defect of the will...” ibid.,
1:242 pph. (Throughout this essay direct quotations which have been
paraphrased so as to employ inclusive language will be identified by pph
in the reference citation.)
4 Ibid., 1:178, 179.
^ Ibid., 1:186 pph.
^ Niebuhr later stated that “Brunner’s whole theological position is
close to mine and. . .it is one to which I am more indebted than any
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Reinhold Niebuhr, His Religious, Social and Political Thought, ed. by
Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall [New York: Macmillan, 1956]
431).
^ Niebuhr acknowledged his indebtedness to Kierkegaard’s insights in no
uncertain terms: In Nature and Destiny he stated that “Kierkegaard
has interpreted the true meaning of human selfhood more accurately
than any modern, or possibly any previous Christian theologian” [ND
1:170-171). He also described Kierkegaard’s analysis of the relation of
anxiety to sin as “the profoundest in Christian thought” (ibid., 1:182,
n. 2; cf. 1:44, n. 4).
8 Ibid., 1:182.
^ Kierkegaard defines the human person as “a synthesis of the infinite and
the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity” (S.
Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death,irdius. by Walter Lowrie [Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944, denoted hereafter as SD] 17).
He also states that “Anxiety is the psychological condition which pre-
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